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ABSTRACT
The financial crisis of 2007–2009 is now broadly recognised as a once-in-a-gener-
ation inflection point in the history of global economic governance. It has also
prompted a reconsideration of established paradigms in international political econ-
omy (IPE) scholarship. Developments in global tax governance open a window onto
these ongoing changes, and in this essay we discuss four recent volumes on the
topic drawn from IPE and beyond, arguing against an emphasis on institutional sta-
bility and analyses that consider taxation in isolation. In contrast, we identify unpre-
cedented changes in tax cooperation that reflect a significant contemporary
reconfiguration of the politics of global economic governance writ large. To
develop these arguments, we discuss the links between global tax governance and
four fundamental changes underway in IPE: the return of the state through more
activist policies; the global power shift towards large emerging markets; the politics
of austerity and populism; and the digitalisation of the economy.
KEYWORDS
Global economic governance; global financial crisis; globalization; OECD; offshore finance; rising powers; tax;
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Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2007–9 ushered in a sense of existential crisis for the
liberal international order (Acharya, 2018; Ikenberry, 2018). It marked the point at
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which the key locus of global economic governance shifted from the G7 to the
G20, and it was part of the narrative around the seismic Anglo-Saxon electoral
events of 2016. Now, the crisis has become a key inflection point in thinking about
growing challenges to global economic governance, such as financial instability,
inequality and overaccumulation. According to the editors of this journal’s 20th
anniversary issue, it “laid bare some fundamental challenges for all contemporary
IPE scholarship” (Johnson et al., 2013, p1012). Such post-crisis stock-taking has
been infused with a sense that international political economy (IPE) scholarship
before and immediately after the crisis did not pay enough attention to big picture
trends in the world we study (Cohen, 2009; Drezner & McNamara, 2013;
Helleiner, 2011).
Global tax governance is a key window onto these trends. As Josef Schumpeter
noted a century ago, ‘the fiscal history of a people is above all an essential part of
its general history’ (Schumpeter, 1991). The same is true at international level: dra-
matic changes to the regime governing the taxation of cross-border investment are
at once symptomatic of and essential to these broader upheavals in the IPE. It is
unclear whether OECD-centric tax institutions can survive in the long term, even
as they have broken new ground in terms of sovereignty-infringement and multi-
lateralism. Catalysed by unilateral action by the United States, governments moved
quickly after the financial crisis to clamp down on the use of tax havens for tax
evasion by wealthy individuals, creating a global regime in which tax authorities
from different states now automatically share bank information with each other
(Hakelberg, 2016a). The OECD claims that EUR 93 billion in tax revenue has been
reclaimed by governments as a result (OECD 2018a, p. 11). In contrast, govern-
ments have moved more slowly to address the problems associated with taxing
multinational firms, struggling to overcome distributional tensions within the
OECD and G20 (Hearson & Prichard, 2018; Lips, 2018).
Taking account of these changes, this essay sketches out a post-crisis research
agenda on the political economy of international tax and its implications for IPE at
large. That agenda, we contend, should aim to explain variation in the speed, scope
and depth of change in the institutions of international tax governance, across time
and issue area (Rixen & Viola, 2016). Pre-crisis, the international tax regime was
marked by stability and incremental change in the face of dramatically escalating
problems of tax avoidance and evasion, and research questions dwelt on this rela-
tive stability. The speed, scope and depth of change have all radically increased
post-crisis, yet much research continues – incorrectly in our view – to minimise
the significance of these developments.
We view the crisis as a structural break that destabilised ideas and institutions,
for example the G7, that had already become out of step with political economic
reality. For IPE scholarship, too, the crisis demonstrated many apparently stable
patterns to be historically contingent and fragile (Johnson et al., 2013). The field of
International Relations has also recently begun to interrogate its understanding of
the ‘when and how’ of change (Paul, 2018, p. 177). In doing the same, we must
overcome political economy’s tendency to ‘understate the extent of change, alterna-
tively to code all observed changes as minor adaptive adjustments to altered cir-
cumstances in the service of continuous reproduction of existing systems’ (Streeck
& Thelen, 2005; see also Oatley, 2019).
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Exhibit A in this regard is the first book reviewed in this essay, an interdiscip-
linary work with a strong IPE contribution, edited by Peter Dietsch and Thomas
Rixen. The volume provides a comprehensive and critical assessment of recent
developments in international tax governance, but adopts what we regard as an
overly pessimistic perspective on the degree to which events since the crisis illus-
trate transformative change. This is partly a timing issue: it is only now, more than
a decade after the onset of the financial crisis, that the true extent of changes is
becoming clear. But it is also a consequence of a focus on tax governance as a dis-
crete area, rather than embedding it within the broader landscape of post-crisis IPE
developments.
We develop this argument by discussing the links between global tax governance
and four fundamental changes underway in the IPE at large: the return of the state;
the global power shift towards large emerging markets; the politics of austerity and
populism; and the digitalisation of the economy. Table 1 summarises these implica-
tions. In doing so, we offer critical reviews of another three empirical accounts
from other disciplines (Fairfield, Jogarajan and Harrington) to illustrate our argu-
ment, while also shedding light on IPE’s added value.
First, governments’ response to the crisis demonstrated a ‘return of the state’,
with a newfound interventionism in a range of economic policy areas. No issue
area throws the tension between globalisation and the state into sharper relief than
international taxation, which has always been at the forefront of the chasm between
globalisation and national sovereignty (Palan, 2003). Since the crisis, governments
have been more willing to act collectively and unilaterally to combat tax avoidance
and evasion by mobile capital. Tasha Fairfield’s comparative politics study, based
on over 400 interviews across Latin America, offers helpful insights into the inter-
face between domestic politics and the structural power of capital here.
Second, the crisis dealt a fatal blow to the legitimacy of already-weakened
governance institutions dominated by OECD powers. In taxation, this has mani-
fested itself in a crisis for a governance system dominated by expert insiders
from a Global North core (Rixen, 2011b). But as Sunita Jogarajan’s legal history
of the origins of that system reminds us, tensions between developed and devel-
oping country actors have been present since the regime’s beginning.
Third, fiscal policy, under the label of ‘austerity’, has been a key part of the
post-crisis political narrative (Blyth, 2013), pushing to the fore the political and
Table 1. Shifts in the global political economy and global tax governance.
Political economic shift Global tax governance shift
The return of the state Greater willingness to act unilaterally has created conditions
for sovereignty-constraining cooperation.
Global power shifts The OECD has adopted institutional innovations that give
non-members the right to varying degrees of
participation.
Austerity, populism and expertise Political engagement with international tax rules has
reduced the autonomy of the tax policy
expert community.
The digital economy Existing rules produce perverse outcomes when applied to
new digital business models, which has led to open
distributional conflict, notably between the EU and US.
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socio-economic inequalities created by globalization, and delegitimising expert-led
global governance. Brooke Harrington’s immersive sociological study of the ena-
blers of tax haven abuse leads her to conclude that the game of ‘cat and mouse’
with tax authorities will continue. In our view, her deep dive into one community
underestimates the normative shift in society at large: in the context of populism,
the appearance of a tolerant attitude to abuse of tax havens by the wealthy has
become increasingly unviable for political actors (Morgan, 2017).
Fourth, large-scale digitalisation of the economy is underway, upending the dis-
tribution of value within global production networks and creating an unprece-
dented consolidation of capital. Trends in the digital economy are inextricably
linked to those in the financial system, for example the ‘dot com’ bubble in the late
1990s and the turn to business models based on data-driven advertising when that
bubble burst (Srnicek 2016), We see the early impacts of digitalisation in the grow-
ing distributional tensions, especially between the US and EU, brought about by
the obsolescence of the century-old global international tax system and the inad-
equacy of existing institutional tools to negotiate a new global settlement.
The essay begins with older, pre-crisis empirical landscape and its scholarship,
demonstrating how the IPE literature consolidated a picture of an unusually resili-
ent regime characterised by sovereignty-preservation, OECD-centrism and techno-
cratic isolation. The subsequent sections discuss how the macro shifts mentioned
above have transformed this regime, critically analysing the contribution each book
under review makes to developing a new understanding of this post-crisis world.
We argue that these books succeed when they allow us to analyse not just stability
and incremental change, but also the rapid changes catalysed by the crisis, which
we argue should be the emphasis of contemporary scholarship on the IPE of global
tax governance.
Stability in pre-crisis global tax governance
The international relations dimension of international taxation1 has its origin in
the 1920s, when states began to consolidate systems for taxing income on capital
and labour and suddenly encountered a series of collective action problems (Rixen,
2008, p. 87). The first to be tackled through international cooperation was the
problem of ‘double taxation’. Left to its own devices, each state would tax its own
residents on their domestic and foreign earnings, but it could also tax foreign
labour and capital on the income earned within its borders. At the same time, the
transnational mobility of capital opened new opportunities for escaping national
tax burdens by arbitraging or evading national regulations. Unless states coordi-
nated with each other, transnational trade and investment posed the dual problems
of double taxation if both home and host state claimed the right to tax and dou-
ble-non-taxation where neither did.
In response, in the 1920s and 30 s, the League of Nations developed formal
guidelines for the allocation of ‘taxing rights’ between states (Jogarajan, 2018;
Picciotto, 1992). The architects of the international tax regime concluded that con-
cerns about sovereignty and the complexity of multilateral negotiations with mul-
tiple distributional axes made a binding multilateral agreement impossible, and so
they created a fragmented regime with no central authority, comprising instead a
network of bilateral agreements (Rixen, 2008, pp. 87–96). The League’s guidelines,
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later inherited by the OECD, were enshrined in model bilateral treaties, to form
the basis of actual treaties negotiated between countries. The bilateral network
expanded rapidly and became the foundation of the international tax governance
system, reaching more than 3000 treaties by the end of the 20th century.
These design choices, however, soon led to unintended conflicts, most particu-
larly the persistence of tax competition and tax havens. Because of growing cross-
border economic integration during the 20th century, nation-states’ tax policies
became interdependent – they shared a tax base of mobile, transnational capital,
and each states’ policy choices impacted the other. Competition between states for
capital ensued, which some argued was desirable as it would pressurise states to
adopt the optimal combination of public good provision and level of taxation to
pay for it (Tiebout, 1956). Subsequent research illustrated that such competition
could also have negative externalities, such as mutual erosion of tax bases and
increased regressivity, as well as a ‘race to the bottom’ (Avi-Yonah, 2000; Oates,
1972). Sovereign jurisdictions thus faced a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, fearing that mobile
capital and labour would respond negatively to increases in the tax rate
they incurred.
This ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, however, had uneven dynamics. In particular, smaller
jurisdictions with little stock of capital of their own stood to benefit more from
attracting foreign capital, compared to larger jurisdictions, which sought to balance
international competitiveness with the integrity of their domestic tax systems
(Rixen, 2010, pp. 43–46). Increased capital mobility and new business models exa-
cerbated tax competition further in the late-20th century, as income was physically
detached from the underlying activities that generated it. This was most notable for
more fungible portfolio capital, while foreign direct investment often continued to
flow to larger markets, given local cost benefits (Haufler & Wooton, 1999). The
result, however, was a continuing downward pressure on corporate tax rates across
the globe (Genschel & Schwarz, 2011; Swank, 2016).
‘Tax havens’ exploited this flexibility by offering the benefits of tax residency
without requiring the physical relocation of people or business functions. These
benefits included low tax rates, a shroud of secrecy to hide assets from other tax
authorities, and rules about the allocation of taxing rights that allowed international
mobile capital to exploit mismatches with other tax systems. The result was the
emergence of a new offshore space, defined by Ronen Palan (2003, p. 19) as ‘a set
of juridical realms marked by more or less withdrawal of regulation and taxation
on the part of a growing number of states.’ Today, around ten percent of all global
wealth remains offshore (Zucman, 2015). The offshore world enables tax avoidance
and evasion, and estimates of the cost of multinational corporate tax have con-
verged around an order of magnitude of $200 billion a year (Crivelli, De Mooij, &
Keen, 2015; OECD, 2015).
The international tax regime designed to solve the double taxation problem was,
however, poorly equipped to deal with these problems, and resistant to change. In
‘The Retreat of the State’, Susan Strange identified it as a hallmark example of the
impotence of states to govern effectively in the world economy, concluding that, ‘it
is clear that the failure of governments to devise a common tax regime imposes
serious costs on all of them’ (Strange 1996, p. 63).
Why was this? To begin with, ‘sovereignty-preserving’ institutional design
choices prevented states from tackling tax havens. While the governance system
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was aimed at handling double taxation, ‘it reinforced the problem of tax evasion
and avoidance. Since governments retain their legislative tax sovereignty, they are
also free to poach the tax base of other countries by offering favourable treatment
to other countries’ citizens’ (Rixen, 2008, p. 150). A major stumbling block for
states keen to deal with the tax haven problem was, then, a system designed to pro-
tect the formal sovereignty of ‘onshore’ states, which effectively allowed ‘tax havens’
to undermine that same sovereignty. The downfall of the OECD’s ‘Harmful Tax
Competition’ project of 1997–2003 provides an apt illustration, the defence of
‘sovereignty’ becoming one of the main rhetorical strategies used by small island
states to resist OECD interference in their tax laws (Sharman, 2006).
A second characteristic that promoted regime stability was states’ vested inter-
ests in maintaining a solution to the double taxation problem that revolved around
the OECD. All states had an incentive to play by the existing rules to facilitate
legitimate cross-border investment flows, even if they were biased in their alloca-
tion of ‘taxing rights’ (Rixen, 2008, pp. 159–161). Thus, developed states – which
benefited disproportionately from the regime’s allocation of taxing rights – were
deterred from any radical change by the fear of destabilising this bias in their
favour (Genschel & Rixen, 2015). For example, despite initial ambitions to future-
proof international tax rules against the emergence of the digital economy in the
late 1990s, when OECD members and non-members collaborated to revise them,
they could only agree on very modest changes, which most states did not consider
worth implementing (Cockfield, 2005).
In the area of tax havens, meanwhile, the OECD’s central role did not raise ire
among developing countries, because developed and developing countries suffered
alike, and stood to benefit from a crack-down led by powerful states. Yet the
OECD’s lopsided membership and technocratic identity, which suited its role as a
focal point for the coordination problem of double taxation relief, was ill-suited to
the kind of expansive enforcement regime that would have been necessary to
resolve the tax haven problem (Sharman, 2006).
A final reason for the regime’s stability was the lack of broad domestic interest
group engagement, meaning an absence of diverse political interference in the tech-
nically obscure policy processes at the OECD, with their consensus-based, expert-
led modes of working (Genschel & Rixen, 2015; Sharman, 2006). Following the fail-
ure of the Harmful Tax Competition project, the Director of the OECD Centre for
Tax Policy and Administration at the time, Jeffrey Owens, specifically lamented the
absence of civil society pressure, saying ‘the emergence of non-governmental organ-
isations intent on exposing large-scale tax avoiders could eventually achieve a
change in attitude comparable to that achieved on environmental and social issues’
(Houlder, 2004).
Where non-state interests did participate, they were primarily technical experts,
in particular from the business community, normatively aligned with the OECD
insiders (Hearson, 2018; Palan, 2003, p. 73; Rixen, 2008, p. 119). Interventions
from non-technical actors, meanwhile, were regarded as aberrations to be reined in
by a community united around common normative foundations (B€uttner &
Thiemann, 2017; Yl€onen & Teivainen, 2017). For example, perceived tax avoidance
by Japanese firms emerged as a political issue in the US at the turn of the 1990s,
and the Clinton administration elected in 1992 introduced new rules for the tax-
ation of multinational companies that deviated from OECD standards. The OECD
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did not embrace this challenge, but treated it as an unhelpful threat to the expert-
led consensus; it formed a task force that criticised the US proposals and eventually
brokered a compromise to limit the damage (Radaelli, 1998).
New politics and new questions
While scholarship before the financial crisis did on occasion speculate on the possi-
bilities for change of greater speed, scope and depth in the international tax regime,
it was the global financial crisis that gave such speculation a firm grounding.
Dietsch and Rixen’s (2016) edited volume, Global Tax Governance: What’s wrong
with it and how to fix it provides a comprehensive analysis of recent material and
normative challenges and changes to the international tax order, as well as prac-
tical, forward-looking reform proposals. In this paper we focus specifically on two
sections of the book, titled ‘The problem: International tax competition’ and
‘Shortcomings of the current regulatory framework and initiatives’. As the titles
imply, the authors detail the structural factors underlying a broken international
tax governance system, finding contemporary attempts by OECD and G20 coun-
tries to fix the system inadequate. The editors’ introduction sets out three reasons
Table 2. Major global tax governance reform attempts pre- and post-crisis.
Dates Nature of change
Inclusive
multilateralism
Institutionalised
enforcement
Sovereignty-
pooling
Tax avoidance:
transfer pricing
guidelines
(Radaelli 1998)
1994–1995 Moderate None: OECD only. None: self-
implementing.
None: adapts
existing
principles.
Tax evasion:
harmful tax
practices
(Webb 2004;
Sharman 2006)
1997–2003 Small None: EU/OECD/
G7 only.
None: sanctions
threat
proves hollow.
None: weak
standards and
bilateralism.
Distribution of
the tax base:
digital
economy
(Cockfield
2005)
1998–2002 Small Some: OECD with
ad hoc
involvement of
some non-
member states.
None: largely
unimplemented.
None: adapts
existing
principles.
Tax evasion:
common
reporting
standard
(Hakelberg
2016a)
2009–2014 Radical Some: rule-
setting by G20,
implementation
by over
100 countries.
Substantial:
credible threat of
G20 sanctions.
Substantial:
strong standards
and a
multilateral
treaty.
Tax avoidance:
Base Erosion
and Profit
Shifting
(Hearson &
Prichard, 2018;
Lips 2018)
2013–2017 Moderate Some: rule-
setting by G20,
implementation
by over
100 countries.
Some: credible
threat of G20
sanctions for
some
minimum
standards.
Some: mixture of
strong and weak
standards and a
multilateral
treaty.
Distribution of
the tax base:
digital
economy
2013–present Potentially
radical
Substantial: rule-
setting and
implementation
by over
100 countries.
Potentially: may
include
minimum
standards.
Potentially: may
include
fundamental
reforms and a
multilateral
treaty.
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for this negative conclusion: the absence of ‘fully global and inclusive’ multilateral-
ism, the lack of institutionalised enforcement, and states’ unwillingness to pool
their fiscal sovereignty (Dietsch & Rixen, 2016).
In our view, that evaluation – not unique by any means to this edited volume –
is overly pessimistic. Indeed, in the short time since the book was published, all
three of these obstacles to radical change have been further eroded. Table 2 lists
major international tax regime reform efforts before and after the crisis, illustrating
how post-crisis developments have demonstrated a trend towards rapid change in
all three areas, towards more radical, inclusive and enforceable governance.
Furthermore, by shifting focus from developments in international tax governance
to those in the IPE in which it is grounded, we identify ongoing pressures for
change, and greater signs of a breakdown in resistance to it. In the following pages,
we discuss the contribution of each of the books under review in the context of
these four macro trends. For each macro change, we first assess its expression in
the transformation from pre-crisis stability to post-crisis change in global tax gov-
ernance, second how the books under review and other recent literature take
account of this transformation, and third how, in our view, the IPE tax literature
should proceed.
1. The return of the state
One consequence of the financial crisis has been a revival of state intervention in
global markets: examples include macreoconomic demand management through
fiscal stimulus packages, the revival of industrial policy, expanded state regulation
in previously self-regulating areas and an acceptance of capital controls (Grabel,
2011; Wade, 2012). This has provided a context in which states that had previously
acquiesced to tax competition are more willing to stand up to the structural power
of capital. For this reason, literature needs to treat the disciplining pressure of tax
competition much more as a variable, rather than an invariant exogenous constraint.
Post-crisis interventionism stands in sharp contrast to the pre-crisis era where,
as Lynne Latulippe (2016) argues in Global Tax Governance, tax competition was
left largely unencumbered because its ‘goodness’ and ‘normality’ had been internal-
ised by governments and policy-makers. Her chapter echoes Jason Sharman’s
(2006) account of how the OECD’s support for ‘legitimate’ tax competition was
weaponised by the defenders of tax havens. The effect, according to Kimberly
Clausing (2016), also in Global Tax Governance, was an ‘inefficient capital alloca-
tion and changing the pattern of capital returns and wages across countries’ and
‘revenue-loss in high-tax jurisdictions relative to low-tax jurisdictions, creating con-
cerns about fiscal externalities and possible under-provision of public goods’
(p. 38).
The trend to more activist states has led to take unilateral action against tax
competition, creating a more sovereignty-constraining regime. Undoubtedly the
most dramatic change here has been the unilateral introduction by the United
States of FATCA (the ‘Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act’), which obliges
financial institutions operating in the American market to provide data on
Americans’ foreign accounts or face heavy withholding taxes. Here the US explicitly
used its hegemonic position in global finance to override the sovereignty-preserving
premise of mutual non-intervention. FATCA created a de facto international
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minimum standard for the exchange of tax information, which authors in the
Dietsch & Rixen volume regard as ‘astonishing’ (Hakelberg, 2016b, p. 124) because
it ‘appears set to profoundly change the capacity for enforcement of individual tax
obligations with respect to offshore accounts’ (Grinberg, 2016).
Importantly, FATCA also ‘unlocked’ a path for similar multilateral systems at
the European Union and OECD-levels, expanding the automatic exchange of tax
information to cover almost 150 countries. This stands in sharp contrast to the
OECD’s previous attempt in the early-2000s, which had ended with relatively weak
standards requiring tax havens only to exchange information with a few other
states on request. While Richard Woodward (2016) in Global Tax Governance
points to continuing inadequacies in the post-crisis regime, he also notes how it
tightens the standards. The success of the new regime in comparison to the HTC
project is attributed by participants to the new credible threat of sanctions by G20
powers, which indicates a new norm of sovereignty-infringement (Eccleston, 2013,
p. 167).
The shift towards a sovereignty-constraining international tax order calls for a
re-examination of our models of state preference formation and cooperation. The
relationship between sovereignty and competition varies between states (Basinger &
Hallerberg, 2004; Pl€umper, Troeger, & Winner, 2009) but also within them, as a
dynamic, even dialectical, balance. We find an excellent guide to this in Tasha
Fairfield’s Private wealth and public revenue in Latin America: business power and
tax politics. Contrary to ‘convergence’ analyses of globalization (Appel, 2011), she
emphasises that the impact of tax competition on each country depends on
national politics rather than purely global factors: ‘Operationalizing structural
power as capital mobility for large-N analysis, which is common in literature on
taxation and globalization, can therefore be problematic’ (p. 279). Fairfield shows
how the pressures of tax competition were counteracted through progressive tax
increases in Argentina in the 90 s and 00 s, enabled by a diverse national economy
and poorly organised economic elites that lacked reliable allies in Parliament. In
contrast, the tax competition imperative took firm hold in Chile, where economic
elites were cohesive and well-connected, and thus able to resist tax increases; pol-
icy-makers became unwilling to promote economic policies that might ‘harm pri-
vate investment and macroeconomic stability’ (p. 71, 99). Finally, in Bolivia tax
policy became a ‘high-stakes balancing act’ for governments, having to trade off
appeasing mass social unrest and business influence, resulting in tax increases on
foreign capital but not national elites.
Fairfield’s sophisticated study of domestic preference formation informs our
understanding of the relationship between domestic tax politics and globalisation.
However, even though it discusses banking secrecy, a core area of OECD-led
cooperation, it nonetheless demonstrates a broader structural problem in the litera-
ture: a disjuncture between studies that focus on tax policies as purely national out-
comes, and those focused on the transnational dimension of tax policy (Hearson,
2018). For example, while arguing for the primacy of instrumental and structural
corporate power at national level, Fairfield notes that their exercise is limited by
‘administrative constraints’ and ‘technical principles’ (p. 11). Yet tax administration
and the framing of technical principles are both highly internationalised and inter-
nationally-influenced activities (Appel, 2011, pp. 32–35; Christians, 2010a). The
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domestic variables that Fairfield emphasises, and the international variables dis-
cussed here, are mutually co-constituted.
The case of banking secrecy is also one in which, by opening up the black box
of domestic politics, the classic dividing line between large ‘onshore’ jurisdictions
seeking to protect themselves from revenue losses, and smaller ‘offshore’ tax
havens, breaks down. While large states themselves have historically had interests
in protecting certain parts of the offshore industry2, recent evidence is demonstrat-
ing that the conceptual distinction between onshore and offshore is now even
more blurred (Cobham, Jansky, & Meinzer, 2015; Garcia-Bernardo, Fichtner,
Heemskerk, & Takes, 2017; Seabrooke & Wigan, 2017). Capital may not always
seek to resist efforts to ‘crack down’ on tax havens, but may see it as a sophisti-
cated form of tax competition. Indeed, the post-crisis tax cooperation agenda has
arguably been designed to reconfigure national legal and administrative practice in
small countries, while ignoring or even giving a selective advantage to the offshore
industries of larger economies (Hakelberg & Schaub, 2017; Sharman, 2016).
These features of the ‘return of the state’ require us to focus our attention on
the changing national-international dynamics and its radical implications for global
tax cooperation and attitudes to sovereignty. In Global Tax Governance, neither
Eccleston and Smith (2016, p. 178) nor Grinberg (2016, pp. 166–169) believe that
recent sovereignty-constraining developments in the area of information exchange
to combat tax evasion have extended to the area of corporate tax avoidance,
addressed by the OECD and G20 through the project entitled Base Erosion and
Profit-Shifting (BEPS). They conclude that corporate tax avoidance presents a
much greater challenge because of its open distributional implications and greater
threat to legislative sovereignty. However, since the volume was written, BEPS has
led to new international institutions with deeper and broader sovereignty-con-
straining effects than ever before. In June 2017, 68 jurisdictions signed up to a
legally binding multilateral tax instrument (‘MLI’), the first of its kind: previously,
multilateral tax cooperation had only soft law status, while hard law was the prov-
ince of bilateral treaties. The MLI immediately overrides more than 1000 bilateral
treaties to close loopholes and strengthen states’ ability to tax international eco-
nomic activity. Importantly, the MLI binds signatories to certain minimum stand-
ards extending beyond administration to tax policy, representing a clear pooling of
legislative sovereignty. The compliance with these standards is further subject to
peer review in the new ‘Inclusive Framework’ at the OECD, a forum encompassing
over 100 countries. Still, as a patchwork of national reservations to the MLI illus-
trates, the future of tax competition and coordination depends firmly on decisions
taken by heterogeneous governments.
2. Global power shifts
The shift in global economic governance after the financial crisis from G7 to G20
was indicative of a second macro trend in IPE: the rise of emerging powers from
outside the OECD (Ban & Blyth, 2013; Wade, 2011; Woods, 2010). As the hegem-
ony of OECD members, and the US in particular, appears at risk, the liberal inter-
national order over which they presided also looks fragile. In older volumes on tax
IPE, non-OECD countries were largely discussed, if at all, in the fact that many
were also tax havens, or that their interests were simply overlooked. More recently,
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as Richard Eccleston (2013, p. 16) has argued, ‘the extent and nature of inter-
national cooperation [is] increasingly dependent on the foreign economic policy
priorities of China and other emerging powers.’
The OECD has not rested on its laurels in the face of this power shift. It now
works much more closely with the G20, rather than G7, which allows it to call on
the material resources and normative authority of an organisation including large
emerging markets (Christians, 2010b; Eccleston, 2013; Grinberg, 2017). It has been
extraordinarily effective at bringing developing countries inside the tent, creating
two new bodies in which developing countries outnumber OECD states.3 This new-
found inclusiveness has bought the OECD legitimacy, but potentially at the expense
of its ability to achieve effective and timely reform (Clifton & Dıaz-Fuentes, 2011).
As a consequence, both member and non-member states have pre-empted the
BEPS project’s most difficult discussions by adopting unilateral anti-avoidance
measures targeting the digital economy. Analyses of tax and other policy domains
suggests that emerging economies’ engagement with existing standard-setting
bodies tends to be selective, balanced against allegiance to their own policy ideas
(Ban & Blyth, 2013; Hearson & Prichard, 2018; Lesage, Lips, & Vermeiren, 2019).
And tensions over the role and legitimacy of the OECD, seen as custodian of a sys-
tem favouring rich developed countries, continue to bubble under the surface of
international tax debates (Eccleston & Smith, 2016).
Sunita Jogarajan’s exhaustive study of the League of Nations negotiations allows
us to take the long view on these power shifts, providing important context on the
frictions it creates. ‘Developing countries issues’ were already considered at the ear-
liest attempts at international tax cooperation (Jogarajan, 2018, p. 251). Just as the
OECD today, the League of Nations in the 1920s gradually broadened its work out
to incorporate more developing countries and thus diverse voices in deliberations.
Yet then, as now, late-comers to international standard-setting can have particular
troubles overcoming its originators’ first-mover advantage. Jogarajan emphasises
the historical importance of the transnational policymaking community in restrict-
ing new-comer influence, operating as key builders and maintainers of the emerg-
ing international tax system. She describes how the early institutional scaffolding
was based on a ‘spirit of compromise and conciliation’ (p. 27–28) amongst experts,
who agreed to ‘set aside personal preferences and nationalistic considerations’ (p.
236). In consequence, the ‘compulsion to follow’ prior ideas that had developed
‘significantly reduced the influence of (… ) new experts’ (p. 165).
Is history repeating itself? Jogarajan believes so, concluding that ‘[t]he time for
radical reform (… ) has passed and (… ) we are locked into the existing paradigm’
(p. 254). This echoes Thomas Rixen’s (2011a) historical institutionalist emphasis on
path dependence following the critical juncture of the League of Nations era. While
it is true that the OECD’s tax standards appear to enjoy near-hegemonic status
across the globe (Hearson, 2016; Wijnen & de Goede, 2013), the changes underway
in global economic governance call into question the durability of this ‘lock in’
effect. In terms of state-centric power, the shift to G20 economic governance illus-
trates that the present era differs from the 1920s and 1930s, in that traditionally
marginalised nations can now challenge a system where historically they could
‘neither profit from tax competition nor effectively compensate competition-
induced revenue shortfalls in capital taxation from other sources’ (Genschel &
Seelkopf, 2016, p. 71). Nonetheless, shifts in the location of authority towards
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emerging economies are certainly not given, and traditional powers remain central,
leaving global governance institutions caught in the middle (Lesage et al., 2019;
Wade, 2011; Woods, 2010). In this sense, international taxation provides an
important window onto the ‘lock in’ effect observable across the IPE, where the
asymmetric distribution of power at one time may enable a configuration of gov-
ernance institutions that erect barriers to future power shifts (Farrell &
Newman, 2019).
Jogarajan’s analysis also demonstrates the need to investigate how state power
interacts with individual personalities to shape historical international tax politics.
For instance, while Britain’s considerable influence in the interwar period related
to its position as ‘a great economy’ (p. 172), its authority depended significantly on
its representative to the League of Nations. The substitution of the ‘strongman’
Percy Thompson with the more ‘willing-to-compromise’ Gerald Canny enabled the
finalisation of a key consensus report in 1927. In the present day, we must also
extend this analysis to consider the staff of the OECD’s secretariat. Pascal Saint-
Amans, Director of its Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, has described his
role as “almost like an entrepreneurial job. You come up with a project; you raise
the funds; you get people to buy into your product; and you move forward”
(Johnston, 2017). Indeed, the OECD bureaucracy played a key role in pushing the
G20 to add tax to its agenda in the post-crisis agenda-setting scramble (Eccleston,
2013). The OECD secretariat acts as a source of ideational authority (Jacobsson,
2006; Marcussen, 2001), which is ‘reinforced by the diffuse sense that the OECD’s
knowledge is an expression of the best states’ best practices’ (Mahon & McBride,
2009), may well be enhanced by its co-optation of the G20.
3. Austerity and populism
The rapid and correlated rise of politics of austerity populism led to ground-break-
ing political events such as Brexit, the US election of President Donald Trump, and
the surge of anti-immigration parties in Europe (Best et al., 2017; Paul, 2018). A
populist backlash against established global governance and the associated ‘death of
expertise’ (Nichols, 2017) is most potently captured in Brexit proponent Michael
Gove’s comment that ‘people in this country have had enough of experts’ (Mance,
2016). In this tinderbox atmosphere, tax politics has caught alight. The domestic
and international politics that shapes and constrains governments’ fiscal actions is
now conducted in the context of frequent front-page news stories about tax avoid-
ance and evasion, alongside broad interest group mobilisation. While the signs of
this politicisation predate the financial crisis (Rixen, 2008, pp. 148–9, 196–7), post-
crisis austerity politics has connected international taxation to broader surges of
populism. As Saint-Amans has noted:
If we step back and look at what’s happened over the past five years, we have moved from
tax being just a tax geek thing to tax being a political item on the G-20 and many
governments’ agendas (Johnston, 2017).
The order-of-magnitude shift can be seen when comparing the controversy sur-
rounding a whistleblower from UBS in Switzerland in 2008–9, especially ‘LuxLeaks’
in 2014, the ‘Panama Papers’ in 2016 and ‘Paradise Papers’ in 2017. The UBS case
involved the confidential disclosure of information to revenue authorities, and the
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discussion it provoked took place almost entirely in elite political settings in the
US Congress and the European Commission (Eccleston, 2013, pp. 115–117). In
contrast, more recent leaks have involved public disclosure of confidential docu-
ments, and, alongside mainstream coverage of the tax affairs of well-known global
brands such as Apple, Google and Starbucks, have driven moral panics over tax
evasion and avoidance, cost political leaders from Iceland to Pakistan their posi-
tions, and put pressure simultaneously on a broad range of states (Oei & Ring,
2017). Previously, the stability of the international tax regime could partly be
attributed to the insulation of a transnational policy community united around a
shared normative foundation (B€uttner & Thiemann, 2017; Hearson, 2018). Now, in
the context of populism and politicisation, a more diverse set of domestic interests
is pressurising international tax policy-makers, and actors from civil society and
academia have entered directly into dialogue with the transnational tax community
(Seabrooke & Wigan, 2016).
Harrington’s (2016) book is an interesting example of a new wave of scholarship
directing attention to the ways in which professionals and experts utilise normative,
cognitive and relational strategies to control global political change (e.g. Ban,
Seabrooke, & Freitas, 2016; Krisch, 2017; Seabrooke & Henriksen, 2017). Training as a
wealth manager, she immersed herself within the ‘offshore industry’, gaining privileged
access to the underbelly of the international tax system. She analyses in micro-level
detail the historical role of the professional community in enabling tax competition and
its effects. Wealth managers ‘grew up’ with the rise of global capitalism, Harrington
argues, employing specialised expertise to effectively constrain attempts at tightening
international tax regulation, ‘thwarting the aims of the state without breaking any laws’
(p. 9). The effect, she notes, was to maintain key features of the international tax regime
and exacerbate its deteriorating effects on sovereignty and inequality. The general belief
within the professional community, however, is simply that their services help states.
Deriding the professions’ poor reputation and its misunderstanding in the general pub-
lic, one wealth manager told Harrington, ‘[w]ithout our profession, there wouldn’t be
the large pools of capital available to fuel economic development’ (p. 257). The respon-
sibility for eroding sovereignty and rising inequality, identified by Harrington as cen-
trally associated with the profession’s work, are argued by wealth managers to rest
rather with exactly the states and institutions now trying to crack down on wealth man-
agers (p. 239).
Like Jogarajan, Harrington’s assessment of the outlook for change is
largely negative:
[W]ealth management will continue to thrive. (… ) [T]he game of “playing cat and mouse
with tax authorities around the world”, as one participant in this study described his work,
seems unlikely to wind down anytime soon (p. 298–99).
Her book is certainly a powerful reminder that the context in which the politics
of austerity and populism have arisen are not self-perpetuating and inevitable, and
that professional experts often fight back. A key contribution is to highlight that
“questions of agency have remained almost totally unexamined. (… ) [W]e still
lack a coherent account of the key actors involved [in processes of inequality], as
well as their methods and motives” (p. 206).
Nonetheless, Harrington may have underestimated the extent to which the post-
crisis political economy context of tax expertise has allowed challenges to
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professional agency to arise and gain momentum. Public and political pressure for a
‘fair’ tax system displays little concern for the normative or technical basis against
which transnational policy-makers have historically judged international tax rules.
Political responses, not least the pressure from OECD member states to initiate the
BEPS project, may often be designed to placate an angry public with ‘political
responses to perceived problems’, more than to engage with the substantive issues
that have led to public concerns (Grinberg, 2017: 1158). Activists have enhanced this
destabilising effect by developing ‘counter-expertise’, pooling various knowledge
resources in strategic coalitions in transnational forums, and successfully combining
private technical and public political strategies (Quack, 2016; Seabrooke &
Wigan, 2016).
The century-long era of ‘quiet politics’ (Culpepper, 2010) in international tax
may thus be over, and problematizing it opens up new fruitful avenues for enquiry.
Studies to date have primarily focused on transnational strategies by critical actors
from the Global North, yet we know much less about how expertise politics oper-
ates in interplay with domestic tax settings, or about how experts and expertise
from emerging and developing countries play into these processes. There’s also the
question of how different settings constrain or enable different kinds of expertise
to gain authority. As Fairfield reminds us, the relative technical proficiency of poli-
cymakers and lobbyists/activists is central to policy outcomes (p. 81 and 152).
These tensions point to an ongoing epistemic struggle for authority between polit-
ical and technical actors.
4. The digital economy
Disruptive innovations such as the ‘sharing economy’, artificial intelligence and 3D
printing, bundled together under the rubric of the ‘fourth industrial revolution’
(Schwab, 2017), are reshaping global value chains, slowly creating new fault lines
among winners and losers from a new type of globalisation (Baldwin, 2018;
Rosenau & Singh, 2002), as well as new distributions of capabilities among states
and non-state actors. These fault lines have shown up quicker in international tax
politics than other areas because of the chasm between public expectations and the
low tax rates paid by the world’s largest digital companies. These upheavals are
pushing the envelope of change in each of the areas we have discussed above: the
political pressures they created have driven a wave of unilateral actions, sparked
vociferous inter-state conflicts that run across the OECD/non-OECD axis, and look
set to break down the expert-led consensus. This is a terrain that differs consider-
ably from that which formed the basis of all four of the books discussed here.
One factor marking out the digital economy is its separation from the underly-
ing physical economy. Tax competition is still analysed, for example in Dietsch and
Rixen, through the dichotomy between ‘real’ competition for job-creating foreign
direct investment and ‘virtual’ competition for tax-optimising portfolio capital. This
distinction is blurred by business models in which companies’ major assets – their
intellectual property – are virtual. The consequence has been digital firms with
hundreds of billions of dollars hoarded offshore, untaxed. As such, it looks increas-
ingly likely that the digital challenge proves the Achilles heel of the century-old
international tax rules. The OECD (2019) has acknowledged that it requires
reforms that ‘may reach into fundamental aspects of the current international tax
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architecture’ that have comfortably privileged OECD countries for decades, and is
addressing the topic through its Inclusive Framework of over 100 countries, rather
than its core membership.
Indeed, digitalisation is eroding traditional coalitions and battle lines. The BEPS
project sought to align taxable profits with ‘value creation’, an idea already being
destabilised by technological changes. The term has thus become a highly contested
battleground, providing a technical fac¸ade for fundamentally distributional politics
(Muniesa, 2017). On one level, the changing international politics reflects changing
patterns of investment flows, for example as the US and China switch places from
net capital importer to exporter and vice versa. More importantly, however,
technological changes are rendering direct investment positions an increasingly
irrelevant axis of conflict between countries, since digital firms can make large
amounts of money in one market without any local capital investment. Market size
is rapidly becoming important, with countries possessing large consumer and user
markets – from China to France – seeking to chip away at core norms of the inter-
national tax regime predicated on physical presence and fixed investment (Hearson
& Prichard, 2018; Rocha & Christians, 2017).
The growth of giant digital firms is also generating conflict between historical
allies, the EU and the OECD, especially the US. The controversies surrounding US-
based digital firms have prompted calls for action at the OECD and G-20 levels
under the BEPS project, but importantly also unilateral action in the European
Union and beyond (OECD, 2018b), with proposals for a new tax on the revenues
of large digital companies alongside antitrust investigations of several large US
MNCs’ tax affairs through the EU’s state aid rules. This has prompted significant
clashes between European and American policy-makers, with the latter condemn-
ing the former for anti-US bias (Rappeport, Schreuer, Tankersley, & Singer, 2018).
As the OECD’s position was already vulnerable, a stalemate between its two
most powerful membership blocs, and the newfound activism of European Union
institutions in international tax matters, could compromise its first-mover advan-
tage and destabilise its leadership role. While the EU has historically taken a back-
seat to the OECD in international tax policy (Radaelli, 1997), today it is the arena
providing the most significant challenges to OECD-led governance (Christensen,
2019). In recent years, EU policy-makers have clashed directly with the OECD con-
sensus on high-profile issues such as corporate tax transparency (Lesage & Kacar,
2013), and now taxing the digital economy. They are supported by an activist civil
society community, critical European politicians, and massive media attention.
Set against all of this, big data is simultaneously enabling international tax
cooperation. A ’transparency revolution’ is underway, permitted by new informa-
tion transmission and security systems that allow safe global exchange of data crit-
ical to national tax compliance. This is illustrated most centrally by the automatic
cross-border information sharing mechanisms of FATCA and its multilateral
OECD counterpart, but also the development of technological infrastructure to
support the obtainment and diffusion of large-scale whistle-blower data (Cockfield,
2016). This transparency, in turn, allows countries oversight of cross-border capital
flows they have not had since eliminating capital controls, reducing the pressures
of ‘virtual’ capital flight. While political economy lies at the heart of the dramatic
progress on exchange of information since the crisis, technological change has also
significantly lowered the barriers to progress.
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Conclusion
Reflecting on the historical contingency of conclusions drawn by IPE scholars in
previous decades, Johnson et al. (2013) posed a question to all those working in
the discipline:
Does what we thought we had learned about the politics of diverse issues such as domestic
and international inequality, development, trade and investment patterns, aid politics, and
democratic and autocratic politics in the shadow of globalization still hold in a post-
crisis world?
By situating international taxation in the context of broader trends affecting the
IPE, we have identified a structural break between the politics of global tax govern-
ance before and after the crisis. This new political economy is characterized by a
growing willingness to pool and infringe sovereignty; the emergence of an OECD-
G20 complex characterized by major internal tensions; significant politicization fos-
tering unprecedented challenges to historically entrenched governance insiders; and
a fundamental shakeup of longstanding political battle lines due to the digitaliza-
tion of economies.
In contrast, much literature on global tax governance continues to emphasize
continuity over change, as illustrated by the prognosis emerging from Dietsch &
Rixen’s edited volume and our assessments of three further monographs. We do
take seriously Jogarajan’s historically-grounded warning that new entrants into the
regime will struggle to undo decisions made by its first movers, as well as
Harrington’s confidence, borne out of her immersive methodology, that recent pro-
gress against tax havens may merely be another move in a cat-and-mouse game,
and Fairfield’s emphasis on the national politics that have always mediated capital’s
structural power. Yet the driving trends we have identified are not unique to tax-
ation. Indeed, the international tax landscape should act as a case study to inform
scholars interested in these broader shifts in the IPE. As Jason Sharman (2012) has
argued, the international tax system can act as a ‘canary in the coal mine’ for
macro trends.
Beyond acting as an example, however, the contribution of developments in
international taxation to broader changes in the global political economy is worth-
while considering on its own. The politicization of tax avoidance and evasion is
not merely a by-product of the politics of austerity, since the wealthy’s ability to
minimize their tax bills has contributed centrally to the depletion of government
budgets and the growth of inequality that fed into austerity politics. One lesson
from Fairfield’s Latin American cases is that such narratives can be powerful weap-
ons in election campaigns. While tax havens did not create the financial crisis, they
were intimately involved in many of the complex structures at its roots. Expertise
politics, meanwhile, by its very nature transcends the boundaries between IPE’s
empirical subfields. Indeed, the ability to draw on different pools of expertise may
be a key resource of influence in global governance (Seabrooke, 2014). At the junc-
ture of tax and trade, for instance, Eskelinen and Yl€onen (2017) have shown how
epistemic arbiters were able to use international trade expertise to resist sanctions
in the area of taxation. Andrea Binder (2019) also illustrates the substitutability of
domestic banking and offshore finance for elites’ wealth protection.
As a final observation, we return to our Schumpeterian view. Because of the
intimate relationship between statehood and the power to tax, tax tells us
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something about state-citizen relations, and hence about the interactions between
states and citizens in the IPE. Before the crisis, the emphasis on stability in litera-
ture on the IPE of tax provided a fascinating window into nation states’ willing
capitulation to the forces of globalisation. Post-crisis literature, we contend, should
now tell us something new about the evolving relationship between the state and
globalisation. And indeed it does. States have, as Lana Mosley (2000) suggested,
significant ‘room to move’ when it comes to fiscal policy, and they have increas-
ingly been willing to use it when political and financial pressures push them
towards doing so. Faced with the challenges of austerity politics, a global power
shift and technological disruption, states have actively breached previous sover-
eignty-based constraints on unilateral and multilateral action. As sovereignty
declines in importance to the international tax regime, we find ourselves question-
ing the dominant narrative of increasing unilateralism since 2016. In the case of
taxation, states are responding to challenges since the financial crisis by coming
together differently, but also – for the time being at least – more effectively.
Notes
1. By ‘international tax’, we mean the taxation by individual states of the income earned
by transnational or internationally mobile factors of production: portfolio capital,
direct investment capital, and labour.
2. The very phenomenon of offshore originated with actions taken by the Bank of
England that led to the creation of the Eurodollar market (Palan, 2003, pp. 26–32),
and the early creation of offshore financial centres in small island states was
encouraged by former colonial powers (Sharman, 2006).
3. The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information has 154 members,
while the Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting has 129 members,
as of June 2019.
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